Torts—Automobile Guest Statute—Status of Person Who Contributes Toward Taveling Expenses by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 24 Issue 1 
January 1938 
Torts—Automobile Guest Statute—Status of Person Who 
Contributes Toward Taveling Expenses 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Torts—Automobile Guest Statute—Status of Person Who Contributes Toward Taveling Expenses, 24 
WASH. U. L. Q. 137 (1938). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol24/iss1/18 
This Comment on Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington 
University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
vivor simply keeps what he or she had before.21 There is no increase in
the estate, and the change is in the person rather than in the estate.22
Therefore the holding that the widow received a right of homestead at
the time of the filing of the deed seems correct.23 If this be carried to its
logical conclusion, it would seem that there may be two persons in the
family who have a vested right to claim exemptions: (1) the husband as
head of the family under the Homestead Act 24 and (2) the wife by reason
of the Married Woman's statute.25 But it has been repeatedly held that
as between husband and wife there can be only one right of homestead,
and that right must be asserted in the name of the husband because so
long as the marriage relation exists de jure, he must be regarded the head
of the family.26
In the instant case the court correctly solves the problem by holding
that while the right vests in both spouses, its exercise by one precludes
exercise by the other. 27  W.J.H.
TORTS-AUTOMOBILE GUEST STATUTE-STATUS OF PERSON WHO CON-
TRIBUTES TOWARD TRAVELING EXPENSES-[Texas].-A Texas statute' re-
quires proof of ordinary negligence in the case of a passenger for hire and
gross negligence in the case of a guest, defining the latter as one who rides
in another's car "without payment." In a recent decision 2 the Court of
the incidents of joint estates the author says, "and therefore, if an estate
in fee be given to a man and his wife, they are neither properly joint
tenants nor tenants in common; for husband and wife being considered as
one person in law they cannot take the estate by moieties, but both are
seized of the entirety, per tout et non per my." See also Goldberg Plumbing
Supply Co. v. Taylor (1922) 209 Mo. App. 98, 237 S. W. 900.
21. Ashbaugh v. Ashbaugh (1918) 273 M'o. 353, 201 S. W. 72.
22. Garner v. Jones (1873) 52 Mo. 68; Rezabek v. Rezabek (1916) 196
Mo. 673, 192 S. W. 107; Fulbright v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (1932) 329 Mo. 207,
44 S. W. (2d) 115; In re Staiger's Estate (1929) 104 N. J. Eq. 149, 144
Atl. 619; In re Dell's Estate (1935) 154 Misc. 216, 276 N. Y. S. 960;
Newsome v. Shackleford (1931) 163 Tenn. 358, 43 S. W. (2d) 384.
23. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 615.
24. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 608.
25. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 2998.
26. Gladney v. Berkley (1898) 75 Mo. App. 98; Martin v. Barnett (1911)
158 Mo. App. 375, 138 S. W. 538.
27. In Morrow v. Zane (1914) 185 Mo. App. 111, 170 S. W. 918, the
Springfield Court of Appeals held however that the wife had in effect
two estates: (1) her own by the entirety which was acquired prior to the
incurring of the debt and in which she therefore could claim homestead;
(2) her husband's estate by the entirety which was acquired by his deed
conveying his interest to her subsequent to the incurring of the debt and
in which she therefore could not claim homestead. The court apparently
bases its conclusion upon the idea that at common law estates by the
entirety were divisible because the husband had right to possession and
usufruct of such lands during marriage and his interest was vendible. But
see Hall v. Stephens (1877) 65 Mo. 670, 27 Am. Rep. 302; National Bank
of Plattsburg v. Fry (1902) 168 Mo. 492, 68 S. W. 348, and the authorities
cited in notes 13, 14, 15, and 16, supra.
1. Tex. Vernon's Stat. (1936) c. 225, art. 6701b.
2. Raub v. Rowe (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) 119 S. W. (2d) 190.
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Civil Appeals declared that where two persons set out to visit a relative,
the fact that plaintiff paid her share of the running expenses of the auto-
mobile did not alter her status as a guest "without payment" under the
statute.
The court was called upon to construe the words "without payment"
in the Texas statute, which also appear in similar statutes in other states.8
Relying chiefly on two California decisions, 4 the Texas court decided that
payment of gas and oil expenses under the circumstances of the present
case was not sufficient to constitute "payment" under the statute. Decisions
under similar statutes in Ohio,5 New York,6 Michigan,7 and Massachusetts s
have indicated that contributions toward gasoline and oil expenses on a
social trip do not change a guest's status into one of passenger for hire.9
Courts in the same states, however, have uniformly agreed that, where the
hiring, of the vehicle is for the business purposes of the owner, no guest
relationship is involved. 0 It is the zone between the clearly social and the
clearly business trips which has given rise to troublesome problems. 1'
Despite the decisions in the above cases, it has been held that under
special facts a guest may become a passenger for hire. For example, in
Beer v. Beer 2 an Ohio court held that where a brother and sister shared
expenses on a trip to visit their father who was ill, the sister occupied the
position of passenger for hire and not a guest. A Washington court13 has
indicated that if there is an express agreement by the parties to share the
expenses of a trip, the relationship of passenger for hire is established. 14
The matter has never arisen in Missouri because there is no statute which
differentiates between a guest and a passenger for hire. A Missouri
statute, 5 which imposes the highest degree of care upon a person who is
driving another in his automobile, has been held to extend to one carried as
a guest.16
3. Cal. Deering's Gen. Laws (1931) art. 5128, sec. 1414; N. D. Laws
(1931) c. 184, 310; Ohio Page's Ann. Gen. Code (1926) see. 6308-6; Wash.
Rem. Rev. Stat. (1933) c. 18, art. 6297-1, sec. 2.
4. McCann et al. v. Hoffman et al. (Cal. App. 1936) 62 P. (2d) 401;
Rogers v. Vreeland (Cal. App. 1936) 60 P. (2d) 585.
5. Ernest v. Bellville (1936) 53 Ohio App. 110, 4 N. E. (2d) 286,
6. Olefsky v. Ludwig (1934) 242 App. Div. 637, 272 N. Y. S. 158.
7. Morgan v. Tourangeau (1932) 259 Mich. 598, 244 N. W. 173.
8. Perkins v. Gardner (1934) 287 Mass. 114, 191 N. E. 350.
9. 4 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile'Law and Practice (1935) 87,
sec. 2293.
10. Smith v. Fall River Joint High School District (1931) 118 Cal. App.
673, 5 P. (2d) 930; Casper v: Higgins (1935) 4 Ohio Ops. 164; Elkins et
ux. v. Foster (Tex. 1936) 101 S. W. (2d) 294; Woodman v. Hemet Union
High School District (1934) 136 Cal. App. 544, 29 P. (2d) 257; 95 A. L. R.
(1935) 1180.
11. Note (1937) 12 Wash. L. Rev. 138.
12. (1935) 4 Ohio Ops. 84.
13. See Eubanks v. Kielsmeier (1933) 171 Wash. 484, 18 P. (2d) 48, 49.
14. See also Elliott v. Behner (1937) 146 Kan. 827, 73 P. (2d) 1116;
Campbell v. Campbell (1932) 104 Vt. 468, 162 Atl. 379, 85 A. L. R. 626.
15. R. S. Mo. (1929) see. 7775.
16. Kaley v. Huntley (Mo. 1933) 63 S. W. (2d) 21.
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The instant case illustrates the difficulty encountered in the attempt to
abide by the strict letter of the statute17 on the one hand and at the same
time to construe the term "payment" so as to reduce the number of col-
lusive suits against insurance companies,' 8 by extending the class of persons
carried as guests.
A. E. H.
TORTS--RES IPSA LOQUITUR-RIGHT OF CONTROL WITHOUT EXCLUSIVE
CoNTROL-[Missouri.-Plaintiff customer was injured when a bolt of awn-
ing material displayed for sale fell upon her from an open counter in the
defendant's store. Plaintiff relied upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Held, though defendant had sufficient right of control as required by the
doctrine, plaintiff failed to exclude the probability that the accident was
caused by the negligence of a third person, and therefore could not recover
on the theory of res ipsa loquitur.2
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been held applicable to cases where
a customer is injured by falling merchandise. 2 In these cases the falling
merchandise was not subject to inspection by the customers. In the instant
case, however, the merchandise was open for inspection and handling by
many customers. The storekeeper, therefore, did not have exclusive control,
although he had the right of control.3 Most jurisdictions require that the
defendant have exclusive control over the article4 and deny recovery where
17. See dissent in Voelkl v. Latin (Ohio App. 1938) 16 N. E. (2d) 519.
18. Note (1936) 10 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 289; Note (1937) 12 Wash. L.
Rev. 138.
1. Hart v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Dry Goods Co. (Mo. App. 1938) 118
S. W. (2d) 509.
2. Garfinkel v. B. Nugent & Bros. Dry Goods Co. (Mo. App. 1930) 25
S. W. (2d) 122; Perry v. Stein (Mo. App. 1933) 63 S: W. (2d) 296; Craw-
ford et al. v. American Stores Co. (1927) 5 N. J. Misc. 413, 136 Atl. 715;
Higgins v. Ruppert (1908) 7 App. Div. 530, 108 N. Y. S. 919; Higgins v.
Goerke-Krich Co. (1918) 91 N. J. L. 464, 103 Atl. 37, aff'd in 92 N. J. L.
424, 106 Atl. 394. However, in the case of Martin v. Brown (1936) 56
Idaho 379, 54 P. (2d) 1157, the court refused to apply the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur to the case of a falling timber in a lumber yard on the
ground that the accident was not so obviously destructive as to require
that the doctrine be used. This reasoning could very well be used in all
cases of falling merchandise in a store.
3. Hart v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Dry Goods Co. (Mo. App. 1938) 118
S. W. (2d) 509; Guttman v. F. W. Woolworth Co. (1936) 159 Misc. 821,
288 N. Y. S. 819.
4. Harper, Torts (1933) 183, sec. 77; The President Wilson (D. C. N. D.
Cal. 1933) 5 F. Supp. 684, Blade v. Site of Fort Dearborn Bldg. Corp.(1927) 245 II1. App. 484; Black Mountain Corporation v. Partin's Adm'r
(1932) 243 Ky. 784, 49 S. W. (2d) 1015; Goldman v. City of Boston (1931)
274 Mass. 329, 174 N. E. 686; Murray v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.(1932) 236 App. Div. 477, 260 N. Y. S. 132; Carter Oil Co. v. Independent
Torpedo Co. (1924) 107 Okla. 209, 232 Pac. 419; Dittert v. Fischer (1934)
148 Ore. 366, 36 P. (2d) 592; U. S. Torpedo v. Liner (Tex. App. 1927)
300 S. W. 641.
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